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STATUTORY REDEMPTION IN COLORADO
FREDERIC P. STORKE* and DON W. SEARS*"
of the Boulder Bar
Editor's note: This article represents one chapter from a book now being
completed by the authors and to be published in the near future.
The statutory right of redemption is to be sharply distin-
guished from the equity of redemption. The latter is destroyed
by the foreclosure sale,26 which gives the purchaser an interest
in the property free of this equitable right. The Colorado Re-
demption Act 27 gives certain rights to redeem after the sale. The
equitable and statutory rights never run concurrently, the latter
becoming effective at the instant when the former ceases to exist.
The statute provides for redemption by three classes of per-
sons:28 (1) owners; (2) persons liable on a deficiency; and (3)
lienors. The manner of redemption by each class and its legal
effect is stated in the act. A period of six months, running from
the date of the foreclosure sale, is set up.29 We will call this "the
standard redemption period." The owner of the property at the
time of the redemption may redeem within this standard period.
No order of redemption is specified during this time, so that either
the owner or other persons liable may redeem without waiting
for the other.
Lienors, whose liens are subsequent to the foreclosed mort-
gage, may redeem after the expiration of the standard period. 0
In order to have this right, a lienor must take two steps during
the standard period. He must record his lien (unless it is already
of record), and he must file a notice of intent to redeem with the
officer making the sale (usually the Public Trustee or Sheriff).31
If no notices are filed, the rights to redeem of all parties terminate
at the end of the standard period, and the purchaser is entitled
to a deed.
If one or more lienors, having recorded liens, duly file notices,
they have a right to redeem according to their priority.3 2 The
"senior" lienor, that is, the one whose lien ranks next after the
foreclosed mortgage, is given a ten day period immediately follow-
ing the close of the standard redemption period, in which he may
redeem. Each subsequent lienor has five days in the order of
priority.
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"' Fisk v. Cathcart, 3 Colo. App. 374, 33 Pac. 1004 (1893).




= Ibid. The annotation to this section erroneously states that the lien must
be of record and the notice filed thirty days before the expiration of the six-
month period. This statement is based on an article by Ira Quiat, VI DICTA 18
(1929), written while the bill was pending. Apparently the thirty-day provision
was omitted from the act as finally passed.
2COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 40, § 159 (1935).
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The existence of the statutory right of redemption makes it
necessary for the purchaser at the foreclosure sale to check care-
fully before he receives his deed. A prematurely issued deed
is void, and there are difficulties in correcting such a mistake. The
purchaser must first inquire of the Public Trustee or Sheriff
whether any notices of intent to redeem have been filed. If there
are none, he calculates six months from the sale and adds one
day, which gives him the earliest date at which a deed may be
issued. If notices of intent have been filed, he multiplies the num-
ber of such notices by five, adds five days to this, plus the six
months standard period, finally adding one more day to the total.
The operation of the Redemption Act is strictly limited to
real estate security transactions. 33 There is no provision in our
statutes for redemption after a foreclosure sale of personal prop-
erty. The Act applies to sales "by virtue of any mortgage, trust
deed or other lien" and also to execution sales. Whether there is
a right to redeem after a foreclosure sale under an executory land
contract depends on the interpretation of the word "lien". The
Colorado courts have described the security interest of the seller
in a land contract as a "vendor's lien".
METHOD OF REDEMPTION
We have seen that a person exercising the equitable right to
redeem must pay the full amount of the mortgage debt. This is
not true of redemption under the statute. The person redeeming
(unless there has been a previous redemption) need pay only the
amount for which the property is sold, plus interest and certain
other charges.3 4 This is a vitally important feature of the whole
scheme, as will be shown in detail later. It is customary to say
the person redeeming must pay the "amount of the certificate."
This refers to the certificate of purchase executed by the officer
conducting the sale, which states the amount for which the prop-
erty was sold. 35 Payment of the amount required to redeem is
made to such officer, who then issues a certificate of redemption 3
to the person entitled thereto. This certificate must be recorded.
If there is no further redemption, the holder of the certificate will
be entitled to a deed.
It will be noted that the owner and a party redeeming be-
cause of a deficiency liability are treated alike both as to the time
within which they may redeem and the method and amount paid.
The first lienor to redeem, although he does so within a different
period, pays the same amount and follows the same method of
payment. The effect of redemption by these different persons is
not at all the same. This will be discussed in detail later.
Successive redemptions are possible whenever one lienor has







intent to redeem.3 7 In this case, the second redemptioner does
not merely pay the amount of the certificate, with interest and
charges. He must add the full amount of the lien of the person
from whom he redeems. If this were not the case, the first re-
demptioner would lose all claim to the property and merely get
back what he had paid to redeem, a clearly unjust result.38 The
net effect would be to give the property to the last redemptioner
instead of to the first, thus destroying the senior lienor's priority.
Let us now consider a hypothetical case involving typical suc-
cessive redemptions, which we will call Illustration I. D mort-
gaged property to C1 and C2 successively for $10,000 and $5,000
respectively, both mortgages being duly recorded. C. and C4 re-
covered judgments for $1,000 and $500 respectively, in that order,
and filed transcripts thereof. The first mortgage was foreclosed
and at the sale held February 15, 1952, C, bid in the property for
$6,000 and received a Sheriff's certificate of purchase, which he
recorded. D made no attempt to redeem, C2, C. and C, all filed
notices of intent to redeem with the Sheriff during the standard
redemption period which expired August 15, 1952. On August
16th, C2 redeemed by paying $6,000 to the Sheriff, who issued the
certificate of redemption to C2 (in all illustrations, amounts paid
for interest and other charges are omitted for the sake of sim-
plicity; the reader must bear in mind that in an actual case these
amounts must be added). C3 wished to redeem immediately, but
was advised by his lawyer that he could not do so until August
26th. The redemption period fixed for C3 begins on August 26th
and ends on August 30th, and is not accelerated by the fact that
C2 redeemed early in his own period.
3 9 Accordingly, C redeemed
on August 26th by paying $11,000 to the Sheriff, being the amount
paid by C2 plus the amount of C 2 's own, lien. On September 4th,
the last day of his own redemption period, C4 redeemed by pay-
ing $12,000 to the Sheriff. This is the amount paid by C, plus
the amount of C3 's lien. On September 5th, C4 demanded a deed
to the premises. Since all periods of redemption had now expired,
the Sheriff delivered the deed to C4. The latter now holds title
to the land free and clear of the claim of D, C1, C2, and C 3. It
should be noted that C4 has paid twice as much for the land as
C, bid at the foreclosure sale. He would not have paid this amount
if he did not feel that the land was worth'more than $12,000.
It will be observed that C1 made a mistake by bidding only
$6,000 when the property was worth $12,000 and his own claim
was for $19,000. In consequence of the redemption, he has so far
Id. § 159.
' This unfair result was actually produced by the statute as originally
passed. Colo. Laws 1929, c. 151, § 2, permitted the second redemptioner to
redeem by paying the amount paid by the first redemptioner. This mistake was
discovered and corrected by Colo. Laws 1931, c. 140, § 1, requiring the later
redemptioner to pay the amount of the lien held by the person from whom he
redeemed.
"COLO. STAT. A-.:v., c. 40, § 159 (193'5).
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collected only $6,000. It is true that he can recover a deficiency
judgment against D for the remaining $4,000, but this may prove
to be uncollectible. If he had been foresighted, he would have bid
the full amount of his claim, provided that he felt that the prop-
erty was worth that much to him. Then the redemption would
have left him with his debt paid in full and if there were no
redemption, he would have property of at least equivalent value.
This brings out one of the basic policies of the Redemption Act.
The very existence of the possibility of redemption brings pres-




When the property is sold in foreclosure, all liens junior to
the foreclosed mortgage are cut off, provided that the holders are
duly joined and served. What happens to these liens in the event
of redemption following the sale? There is a widespread doctrine
that at least some of these liens revive as a result of the redemp-
tion. There is a very plausible argument for this result. The
redemption statutes in most states provide that redemption shall
annul the sale. 41 Since it is the sale which destroys the liens, it
quite naturally follows that annulment of the sale will restore
the liens. Many of the cases rely on this simple doctrinal inter-
pretation without consideration of the soundness of the result
reached by holding that the liens revive.
Revival of liens has been called "a trap for the unwary." 42_
Suppose that Illustration I occurred in a state where all liens re-
rived on redemption. It would be quite unwise for D to redeem.
While he could get his property back on payment of $6,000, the
lien of the foreclosed mortgage would revive as security for the
balance of $4,000. The mortgagee could foreclose all over again to
collect this balance. As we shall see later, the present Colorado
statute prevents this result.
Revival of liens must not be confused with the accrual of a
lien de novo.43 Suppose Illustration I occurred in a state where
the lien of the foreclosed mortgage did not revive on redemption.
The mortgagee could secure a deficiency judgment and file a tran-
script, thus securing a new lien on the redeemed land. So far as
D is concerned, he is no better off than if the lien actually revived.
There is an important difference, however, when the owner of
the premises at the time of foreclosure is a non-assuming grantee,
G. In a state where liens revive, the land in the hands of G is
subject to the mortgage. However, the filing of a transcript of
the deficiency judgment against D does not result in a lien against
4Durfee and Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale, 23 MIcH. L.
REv. 825 (1925) ; Note, 5 U. OF CHI. L. R EV. 624 (1937).
41 See, for example, CoLo. STAT. AN., C. 40, § 72 (1935), "the said sale and
the certificate thereupon granted shall become null and void."
" Durfee and Doddridge, note 40 supra.
'OsBoRNE WON MORTGAGES, § 309 (1951).
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the land of G. Consequently in a state where liens do not revive.
G gets the property completely free from any claim of C for the
deficiency.
Like most other states having redemption statutes, Colorado
has adopted the doctrine of revival of liens. This is true both
under the present statute, passed in 1929, and predecessor stat-
utes. The decisions under the earlier law were contradictory and
there was an attempt to clarify the law in the 1929 Act. This
lays down specific rules on the subject, in contrast to the older
statutes which merely provided that the sale should be annulled
by redemption, with no mention of revival of liens.
EFFECT OF REDEMPTION BY ORDER
When the owner of mortgaged premises redeems from a fore-
closure sale, the result is to annul the sale and leave the premises
subject to all liens except the lien of the foreclosed mortgage, which
is discharged by the sale. 44 In other words, the redeeming owner
gets his property back subject to the junior liens which would
have been cut off if there had been no redemption. In Illustra-
tion I, the lien of C1 does not revive as security for the $4,000
still due on his mortgage, but the liens held by C2, C,,, and C4 all
revive upon redemption. It does the owner very little good to
redeem unless he is in a position to pay off the junior liens.
Only one case involving the effect of redemption by the owner
under the present law has been found. In Home Owners' Loan
Corporation v. Meyer,45 there was no actual redemption but the
court treated the case as if the owner had redeemed, because of
an estoppel against the foreclosing creditor. The Loan Corpora-
tion, C1 , foreclosed a deed of trust on property owned by Lippis
(D), bid in the land and received a certificate of purchase from
the Public Trustee. Meyer (C2 ) held a junior judgment, with a
duly recorded transcript, which was cut off by the sale. C1 de-
cided to give D a further opportunity to pay off the loan. After
expiration of the redemption period, C1 should have applied to
the Public Trustee for a deed, conveyed the property to D, and
taken back a new deed of trust. This would, have completely
eliminated C2, who had failed to redeem. Instead, C1 assigned his
certificate of purchase to D, who presented it to the Public Trustee
and asked for a certificate of redemption, which was given to him.
Observe that D, as holder of the certificate of purchase, was en-
titled to a Public Trustee's deed, and if this had been issued all
would have been well. D gave C1 a new deed of trust, which was
later foreclosed, and C1 once more acquired the property. But C,
now claimed that his junior lien was revived by the "redemption"
again the land now owned by C 1. This position was upheld by
the court. C1 , having acquiesced in the issuance of the certificate
'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 40, § 161 (1935).
1 110 Colo. 501, 136 P. 2d 282 (1943); Storke, A Decade of Colorado Law, 23
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 247 (1951).
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of redemption to D, was estopped to claim that there had been
no redemption in fact.
The case is an object lesson in foreclosure procedure. The
foreclosing creditor should follow the method prescribed by the
statute without attempting to invent short-cuts. It is clear that
no one should attempt foreclosure without a thorough study of
the Colorado Redemption Act.
Although the lien of the foreclosing mortgagee is not revived
under the present statute, he may recover a deficiency judgment
and file a transcript. The words of the statute "lien of the fore-
closed mortgage, which is discharged by the sale" do not mean
that the mortgage debt is discharged, but merely the lien. Any
other interpretation would do violence to the well established
right to a deficiency judgment. That the foreclosing mortgagee,
on following this procedure, will acquire a lien de novo on the
property of the owner who redeems is clearly indicated by the
case of Twogood v. Ocsay.
46
In the Twogood case, C1 , one of several mechanic's lienors
holding liens of equal priority, foreclosed and the other lienors
intervened. The property was purchased by Twogood (P), for
$825. This sum was pro-rated among the lienors whose claims
totalled $2,500. As the owner, Cauley (D), was personally liable
for the debts secured by mechanic's liens, deficiency judgments
were entered against him in favor of the lienors. One of these,
Gratke (C2 ), filed a transcript of his deficiency judgment and
assigned it to Ocsay (C 2X), who filed a notice of intent to redeem
with the Sheriff and tendered the necessary amount within the
ten-day period following the close of the standard redemption
period. P sued to enjoin this redemption, but the court held for
CX. P argued that the lien of C2X was not "subsequent" to the
foreclosed lien of C 1, hence C2X had no right to redeem. The
court pointed out that C2X was not redeeming by virtue of the
mechanic's lien, which was discharged by the sale, but by virtue
of the judgment lien, which accrued when the transcript was
filed and was therefore subsequent to the foreclosed lien. During
the redemption period, D still had an interest in the property.
The lien of the deficiency judgment attached to this interest, so
that C2X was entitled to redeem. The implications of this deci-
sion are tremendous, and will be further considered in the dis-
cussion of the effect of redemption by lienors. For our present
purpose, the important point is that any person holding a defi-
ciency judgment may acquire a lien de novo by filing the transcript.
EFFECT OF REDEMPTION BECAUSE OF A DEFICIENCY
The clause of the statute just discussed provides for redemp-
tion by the "owner", not by the "mortgagor". When the original
mortgagor transfers all his interest, he cannot redeem as "owner".
If he is still personally liable, however, he may redeem by virtue
197 Colo. 300, 48 P. 2d 1119 (1935).
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of the clause in the statute, permitting redemption by "any person
who might be liable upon a deficiency." 41
When D, after mortgaging property to C to secure his own
debt, transfers all his interest to G, G is entitled to redeem as
owner and D as a person liable for the deficiency. If G has assumed
the debt and makes a further transfer to GG, GG can redeem as
owner, D and G as parties subject to a deficiency liability. But
if G did not assume in this last situation, he has no right to
redeem at all. He is not the owner and is not liable for any de-
ficiency.
The clause permitting redemption because of a liability for
a deficiency is not common in redemption statutes. It did not
appear in our legislation before 1929. No case involving the
operation of the clause has come before our Supreme Court. What
is the object of such a provision, and how does it work in practice?
The clause permitting redemption by the owner is based on
a policy of ownership protection, giving the owner an extra six
months to occupy his home and attempt to refinance the loan. The
object of permitting redemption by a person liable on a deficiency
is quite different. It is based on the fact that such a person is
usually a surety for the owner. It forms part of a general policy
of suretyship protection. Its effect is to enlarge a surety's right
of subrogation.
The effect of this type of redemption is to make the person
redeeming "the owner of the lien redeemed from, to the full extent
thereof including all extra costs and expenses paid by such redemp-
tioner, who shall nevertheless be still liable for such deficiency." 41
Notice, it is the lien, not the property, of which the redemptioner
becomes the owner. As the redemption annuls the sale, the owner
is benefited. He is no longer in danger of losing his property at
the expiration of the redemption period. However, his land is
subject to the lien now held by the redemptioner. The latter may
foreclose if this lien remains unpaid.
Let us consider a typical suretyship situation, Illustration II.
D borrows $10,000 from C, giving his note for the debt, which is en-
dorsed by S for D's accommodation. D also gives C a mortgage
as further security. When the debt falls due, and at any time
before a foreclosure sale, S may pay it and will then be subro-
gated 41 to the note and mortgage. This puts S in the same posi-
tion as if C had assigned the note and mortgage to S. As between
D and S, the former should have paid the debt. When S paid, he
acquired a right of reimbursement 50 against D, that is, a personal
right of action to recover the amount paid. The right of subroga-
tion gives him a security interest in D's land designed to make
the right of reimbursement more effective.
" COLO. STAT. ANN:., c. 40, § 158 (1935).
Id. § 161.
'Watts v. Bock, 80 Colo. 223, 249 Pac. 1095 (1926); RESTATEMENT, RESTITU-
TION, § 162 (1937); OSBORNE ON MORTGAGES, § 278 (1951).




S's right to pay the debt would be terminated by the fore-
closure sale if it were not for the provisions of the Redemption
Act. The Act gives him an additional six months to exercise this
right, on somewhat modified terms. When C forecloses and bids
in the property for the full amount of his claim, S has no right
to redeem. His liability for the deficiency is at an end. But if C
bids only $8,000 and receives a certificate of purchase, S may
redeem regardless of any actual judgment for the deficiency.
Although S owes C $10,000 plus, he may redeem by paying $8,000
with interest from the date of the certificate. He is still per-
sonally liable to C for the balance of $2,000 plus, as expressly
provided in the Act."'
The usual equitable right of subrogation does not arise until
the surety pays the debt in full. The statutory right given by the
Redemption Act requires only the payment of the amount paid
at the sale, plus charges. It is clear that S may foreclose for this
amount, but not for the additional amount of the deficiency, if
he has not actually paid this. If he does pay the deficiency before
foreclosing, may he add this amount to his lien? While the statute
does not make this clear, he should have a right to do so on the
basis of the underlying ideas of subrogation.
Suretyship relationships are not confined to accommodation
loans like the foregoing illustration. They arise out of almost
every transfer of mortgaged property. Particularly, where the
owner of mortgaged property sells it to a grantee who assumes
the mortgage, the grantee becomes the principal debtor and the
grantor-mortgagor a surety. This relationship is definitely rec-
ognized by the courts.52 It is based on the fact that the grantee
has received credit for the amount of the mortgage as a deduc-
tion from the purchase price, and both parties clearly contemplate
that he should pay the mortgage debt. If he fails to pay it, and
there is a foreclosure and a deficiency, the mortgagor is in the
same position as S was in Illustration II, above. He is a party
liable for the deficiency and has a right to redeem and be sub-
rogated to the mortgage. He also has a personal right of reim-
bursement against the grantee.
The right of the mortgagor to redeem and be subrogated
exists even if the grantee does not assume, provided that the
amount of the mortgage has been deducted from the purchase
price. In this case the mortgagor has no right of reimbursement,
since the grantee is not personally liable. It may seem strange
that a suretyship relationship should exist here, where only one
person is liable for the debt. The courts have worked out a doc-
trine that the land is the primary fund for the payment of the
mortgage debt. Sometimes they appear to personify the land as
the principal debtor in order to emphasize that the mortgagor is
a surety. This treatment is necessary to prevent the unfair wind-
5'COLO. STAT. A-cN.. C. 40, § 161 (1935).
":Note 50 supra; RESTATEINENT, SECURITY, § 83(c), comment e (1941).
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fall which would result to the grantee if he were allowed to keep
the land while the mortgagor paid the debt. The net result is that
the mortgagor is a party entitled to redeem because of his defi-
ciency liability, and becomes the owner of the lien upon redemption.
How does the statute apply when a person liable on a defi-
ciency is in no sense a surety? This possibility will be indicated
in a hypothetical case, Illustration III. D owned property which
he valued at $15,000, and which he mortgaged to C for $10,000.
He sold it to G, who paid him the entire $15,000, relying on D's
promise that he would pay off the $10,000 mortgage when it fell
due. D failed to make this payment, C foreclosed and bid in the
property at the sale for $8,000. D was then a party liable for a
deficiency. He redeemed by paying $8,000 to C, and claimed to
be the owner of the mortgage with the right to foreclose it
against G.
Although a literal application of the statute would seem to
sustain D's position, it is quite certain that the courts would deny
the foreclosure action. Probably G's best defense would be to
counterclaim for $10,000, the loss resulting from the failure of
D to discharge the mortgage debt as he had promised to do. He
should also ask for cancellation of the mortgage. This procedure
enables the court to reach the equitable result without doing vio-
lence to the wording of the statute. Conceding that D has become
the owner of the mortgage, he has no right to foreclose it because
nothing is due him thereon after a proper adjustment of the
claims of the parties. Another way to state this result is to say
that D's ownership of the mortgage is based on his right of sub-
rogation and this does not exist because D is not a surety.5 3 He
has merely paid his own debt, for which he is primarily liable by
the terms of his arrangement with G and the payment by the
latter of the full purchase price. G is a "property surety," 54 one
whose land is secondarily liable for the debt of another.
In the foregoing illustration, D expressly promised G to dis-
charge the mortgage. Even if he made no such promise, the result
is exactly the same. G has an equity that D shall pay the mort-
gage based on G's payment of the full purchase price without
deducting the mortgage debt. The law imposes a duty on D to
discharge the mortgage regardless of any promise.
EFFECT OF REDEMPTION BY LIENOR
One purpose of giving lienors a right to redeem is to make
any surplus value in the mortgaged property available to others
having liens thereon. - Another purpose, not clearly apparent
from the statute itself, is to bring pressure on the foreclosing mort-
gagee to bid a fair amount for the property. In Illustration I,
above, D bid only $6,000 for property which was worth much
more. If he had realized that he would lose the land because of
OSBOR NE ON MORTGAGES, § 278 (1951)
RESTATEMFNT, SECURITY, § 83(b), comment c (1941).
Stevenson v. Sebring, 63 Colo. 4, 164 Pac. 308 (1917).
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the redemption by a lienor, he would probably have bid the full
amount of his claim. There seems to be fairly general recognition
of this fact by banks and other institutional lenders, so that it
is quite a standard practice to bid the full amount of the mortgage
debt, when the land is fairly worth that amount.
The statute 6 provides that when redemption is made by a
lienor, his certificate of redemption operates as an assignment to
him of the estate and interest acquired by the purchaser at the
sale, subject however, to the rights of persons who may be entitled
subsequently to redeem. As the purchaser at the sale acquires
the property free and clear of all junior liens, this should be
equally true of the redemptioner. In this provision there is no
statement that the sale is annulled. This indicates that there
will be no revival of liens when a lienor redeems. This is very im-
portant, as there was case authority prior to 1929 indicating that
an intermediate lien revived when a subsequent lienor redeemed.5 7
We have seen that when the foreclosing mortgagee becomes
the purchaser at the sale, he may lose the land to a redeeming
lienor while part of the debt remains unpaid. This cannot happen
to a redeeming lienor. The latter either keeps the land perma-
nently, or loses it to another redemptioner with the compensation
of having his own claim paid in full. It is the obvious intent of
the statute that the last redemptioner should keep the land, regard-
less of whether it is worth the amount spcured by his lien, a frac-
tion of this amount or many times the amount. The court so held
in Bailey v. Erny,5  interpreting a predecessor statute. The pur-
chaser at the foreclosure sale tried to prevent a judgment creditor
of the mortgagee from redeeming by paying him the amount of
his judgment. The court held that he had no such right, and
awarded the land to the redeeming judgment creditor.
The rule of- Bailey v. Erny gave the last redemptioner an abso-
lute right to the land. This rule was severely limited in Plute v.
Schick,59 which held that under certain circumstances the pur-
chaser at the foreclosure could retain the land by paying off the
claim of the lienor desiring to redeem. This is a very unfortunate
decision,60 which not only contradicts the letter of the statute, but
seriously undermines its basic policy. Permitting junior lienors
to redeem penalizes underbidding by the foreclosing mortgagee.
If he can escape the penalty by paying off the lienor, there is far
less incentive for him to bid a fair amount at the sale. In order
to discourage underbidding, provisions penalizing it should be
strictly enforced even if this occasionally gives the redeeming
lienor an undeserved windfall.
T CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 40, § 161 (1935).
"Stryker v. Dunn, 72 Colo. 45, 209 Pac. 644 (1922). But see Harrington v.
Anderson, 87 Colo. 417, 288 Pac. 1049 (1930), reaching a contrary result without
discussion of Stryker v. Dunn.
68 Colo. 211, 189 Pac. 18 (1920).
19 101 Colo. 159, 71 P. 2d 802 (1937).
60 Case note, 12 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 58 (1939).
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In this case Schick (C1 ) held two deeds of trust on a house.
one given by Kist (D) and the other by his grantee, Baxter (G).
C1 foreclosed and bid in the property for $1,244.78. He also pro-
cured a quitclaim deed from G, went into possession and made
improvements. Plute (C 2X), discovering a judgment for $52.50
outstanding against the property in favor of Connor (C2), pro-
cured an assignment of this judgment. He filed notice of intent
to redeem on the last day of the standard redemption period, and
within the following ten days tendered the amount necessary to
redeem to the Public Trustee. The Trustee had issued a deed to
C1 on the last day of the standard period. This was clearly pre-
mature, even if no notice of intent to redeem had been filed, so
the Trustee withdrew the deed. C1 now paid the amount due on
the judgment to the clerk of the court in which it had been recov-
ered, claiming this cut off C 2X's right to redeem. C 2X brought
an action to compel the Public Trustee to issue a deed to him,
joining C1 as a defendant. The court denied any relief to C2X
and indicated that the Public Trustee could properly issue a deed
to C 1.
It is notorious that hard cases make bad law. Courts have
always had trouble in deciding which of two innocent parties
should bear a loss caused by the wrongful conduct of another. In
Plute v. Schick they faced the problem of determining which of
two undeserving parties should get a windfall. They solved it
by taking the property away from the party who would otherwise
get the biggest windfall, and whose conduct seemed to the court
to be most reprehensible. C2X had borrowed the abstract from
C1 as a prospective purchaser, discovered the outstanding judg-
ment and bought it up in order to get the land for a song. How-
ever, C, had violated two of the principles which the statute is
designed to promote. He had bid in the property cheaply at the
sale and should have been penalized for underbidding. He had
taken possession during the redemption period, though the statute
is designed to prevent this. The conditional and inchoate nature
of the interest held under a certificate of purchase is sufficient
warning to the purchaser not to make improvements before he
secures a deed. Such improvements are made at his peril and
should create no equity against redemption. The court purported
to apply the spirit of the statute as against its letter, but com-
pletely failed to comprehend its underlying purpose.
FORECLOSING MORTGAGEE AS SUBSEQUENT LIENOR
In Twogood v. Ocsay,6 1 a creditor redeemed by virtue of a
deficiency judgment recovered after the sale. He was not the
foreclosing mortgagee, but apparently the latter would have the
same right. Both of these parties were mechanic's lienors en-
titled to share equally in the proceeds of the sale. Under an earlier
statute, the courts had decided that a foreclosing mortgagee who
recovered a deficiency could redeem from his own sale as a judg-
I1 Note 46 supra.
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ment creditor, -6 2 and Twogood v. Ocsay indicates that the same
result would be reached under the present act.
Assuming this to be true, when would a foreclosing mort-
gagee wish to redeem and what would he gain by it? We will
consider a hypothetical case, Illustration IV. C1 held a $10,000
mortgage given by D on land worth $15,000. C1 foreclosed, and
finding no junior liens of record, decided to bid only $6,000. He
bought the land for this amount and recovered a $4,000 deficiency.
A month later C 2 recovered a $100 judgment against D. He filed
a transcript and notice of intent to redeem. C1 then consulted a
lawyer, who advised him that C2 could take the premises from
him by paying $6,000 plus interest. He suggested that C1 file the
transcript of his deficiency judgment and a notice to redeem.
Then if C2 redeemed during his ten-day period, C1 could re-redeem
from him by paying $6,100. The practical result is exactly like
Plute v. Schick,63 namely, to enable the foreclosing mortgagee to
keep the land upon paying off C2's judgment. The procedure in
Illustration IV, however, enables C1 to pay off C2 regardless of
the special equities existing in the Schick case. It can be seen,
therefore, that the Schick and Twogood cases can be used by the
mortgagee to escape the penalties for underbidding.
Our hypothetical mortgagee discovered that the power to
redeem from his own sale gave him an even greater advantage
than the one just discussed. Why wait until someone else recovers
a judgment against the mortgagor when he can file the transcript
as soon as he recovers his deficiency judgment? Then he would
be a lienor subsequent to the foreclosed mortgage but prior to any
judgment creditor who files later. The mortgagee-purchaser can
file his notice of intent to redeem and sit back to see what happens.
If junior liens and notices of intent are filed, he redeems within
the ten-day period and no one can redeem from him for less than
$10,000. If there are no such notices, he does not redeem, keep-
ing the land and the deficiency judgment. Of course if the land
is really worth $15,000 and C2's judgment is small, C1 would
actually prefer the position of a junior lienor entitled to redeem
from C2 . The danger in waiting is that someone may file a judg-
ment so large that it would not pay C1 to redeem from it. It should
be further noted that the filing of the transcript of the deficiency
judgment is only designed to protect C1 against liens filed subse-
quently. Liens filed before the sale retain their priority over the
deficiency judgment.
It follows from this discussion that some rather strange re-
sults follow from the rule permitting the foreclosing mortgagee
to redeem from his own sale.6 4 It is probably advisable to amend
-Bailey v. Merritt, 90 Colo. 338, 9 P. 2d 485 (1932); Harrington v. Ander-
son, 87 Colo. 417, 288 Pac. 1049 (1930) ; Leavitt v. Continental Trust Co., 71 Colo.
3, 203' Pac. 666 (1922).
63Note 59 supra.
64 Our courts apparently adopted the rule from Illinois. Leavitt v. Conti-
nental Trust Co., note 62 sitpra. For criticism of the Illinois rule see OSBORNE
ON MORTGAGES, § 310, note 88 (1951).
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the statute to prevent this, and also to repeal the rule of Plute v.
Schick.
MISCELLANEOUS REDEMPTION PROBLEMS
When the last redemptioner keeps the land, what becomes of
the claim which he holds against the mortgagor? The better view
is that the debt is paid to the extent of the value of the land, less
the amount paid to redeem, and this view is accepted in Colorado.6 5
In Illustration I, C4 paid $12,000 to redeem and his own judgment
was for $500. If the value of the land was $12,300, the judgment
would be reduced to $200.
At a foreclosure sale involving rental property, the court
sometimes orders the sale to include the rents during the redemp-
tion period. This was true in The Norman, Inc. v. Holman.66 The
purchaser on foreclosure paid a substantially larger sum for the
privilege of acquiring the rents, and it was this larger sum that
was paid by a redemptioner. The purchaser claimed the right to
retain these rents after the redemption, but the court correctly
ruled that they were part of the estate sold on foreclosure and
passed to the redemptioner.
During the redemption period, the mortgagor continues to be
the "owner" for certain purposes. He has the right of possession
and his "title" is not divested until the sheriff's deed is deliveredC7
Even after the standard redemption period has expired, the mort-
gagor has an insurable interest and is entitled to the full amount
of the insurance in the event of a loss. 6 8 On the other hand, the
purchaser on foreclosure is considered the "owner" during the
redemption period for purposes of the Mechanic's Lien Law.6 9
Quite likely the mortgagor could also be considered an owner for
this purpose.
The problem of redemption by owners of fractional interests
after foreclosure often arises and is controlled by the principles
previously stated in connection with the equitable right of redemp-
tion. The Colorado cases are concerned with the right of a judg-
ment creditor to redeem, when his judgment is against one of
two persons having undivided interests in the land. Redemption
is permitted on payment of the full amount of the certificate. 70 A
curious fact variation is found in Leach v. Torbert.71 A creditor
had recovered a joint judgment against two persons, one of whom
'Bailey v. Merritt, 90 Colo. 338, 9 P. 2d 485 (1932). Accord. Sprague v.
Martin, 29 Minn. 226, 13 N. W. 34 (1882) ; OSBORNE oN MORTGAGES, § 310 (1951).
"105 Colo. 294, 97 P. 2d 739 (1939).
The court found a "constructive" delivery in Bankers' Building Associa-
tion v. Fleming Lumber Co., 83 Colo. 335, 264 Pac. 1087 (1928), where the Public
Trustee executed the deed and retained it in his possession.
"Farmers' Union Association v. San Luis State Bank, 86 Colo. 293, 281
Pac. 366 (1929). The fire occurred within the three months period for redemp-
tion by judgment creditors under the law as it stood at the time.
G COLO. STAT. AN-,N., c. 101, Art. 2 (1935). See case cited note 67 supra.
" Walker v. Wallace, 79 Colo. 380, 246 Pac. 553 (1926); Bailey v. Erny, 68
Colo. 211, 189 Pac. 18 (1920).
1 71 Colo. 85, 204 Pac. 3'34 (1922).
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owned an undivided half interest in the foreclosed land, the other
having no interest. The judgment creditor attempted to redeem,
but as he had entered a satisfaction of the judgment against the
debtor who owned part of the land, the court correctly held that
this attempt was ineffective.
THE OLDER LEGISLATION
Before 1929 there were various provisions scattered through
the Colorado statutes affecting the right to redeem from fore-
closure sales. Most of these were retained in the Colorado Statutes
Annotated (1935) ,72 in spite of the repealer clause to be discussed.
There was a statute giving a right of redemption from execution
sales, 73 and a separate section providing that redemption from
foreclosure sales should be governed thereby.7 4 Another statute
controlled redemption from sales by the Public Trustee.
7 5
These statutes, like the present one, provided for a standard
redemption period of six months. Judgment creditors of the secur-
ity debtor could redeem within a three-months period following
the standard period. It was immaterial whether such creditors
held a lien, but only those having an actual judgment had a right
to redeem after the standard period. Junior mortgagees could
redeem within the standard period when the sale was under an
execution or foreclosure. In the case of sales by Public Trustee,
there was a separate provision for encumbrancers to redeem, ap-
parently during the standard period.
Originally there was no provision that judgment creditors
should redeem in the order of their priority, any such creditor
being allowed to redeem any time within the three months. This
created a "race of diligence" since, if a creditor whose judgment
was senior failed to redeem until some junior creditor had done
so, the former could not redeem without paying the junior judg-
ment and so forfeiting his priority.7 6 The effect of "revival of
liens" on this rule will be discussed later. As the statute stood
in 1921, two-day periods were set up in which lienors could redeem
in order of their priority. The method of redemption by judgment
creditors was cumbersome, requiring a second sale by the redeem-
ing creditor after he had paid the redemption money.
The adoption of the present redemption law in 1929 77 was
a great improvement. A single method was made applicable to
mortgage foreclosures, sales on execution and sales by Public
Trustee. The three months period was abolished and judgment
creditors, as well as other lienors, were allotted specific and ex-
clusive periods to redeem. The method of redemption was sim-
'CoLo. STAT. ANN., C. 40, §§71-78; c. 93, §§ 60-66 (1935).
7 3 COLO. Comp. LAWS, §§ 5950-5956 (1921).
% Id. § 5078.
'Itd. §§ 5053-5060.
76Paddack v. Staley, 13 Colo. App. 363, 58 Pac. 363 (1899); Stryker v. Dunn,
72 Colo. 45, 209 Pac. 644 (1922)
" Colo. Laws 1929, c. 151.
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plified and improved. Under this law the purchaser at the sale
could receive a deed after six months if no notices of intent to
redeem were filed, instead of nine months.
There was a general repealer clause in the new act Is with a
saving clause as to mortgages and deeds of trust executed prior
to the passage of the act.79 In the rare event that a mortgage of
such an ancient vintage should be foreclosed, the purchaser should
take care not to have the deed issued before the end of the nine
months period.so
CASES INTERPRETING THE OLD STATUTES
Of the many decisions discussing the rules governing redemp-
tion prior to 1929, many have been rendered obsolete by statutory
changes, while others still have some value as precedents. In the
former category are included cases involving the revival of liens.
The importance and difficulty of this problem justifies a brief
summary of these cases.
Floyd v. Sellers I" laid down a rule that all liens revived when
the security debtor (judgment debtor) redeemed, and that no liens
revived when a judgment creditor redeemed. The first branch of
the rule was qualified in Mihoover v. Walker, -8 2 which held that
Junior liens revive but not the lien of the foreclosed mortgage
upon redemption by the owner. This is the rule now in force by
the express terms of the 1929 Act.
3
The rule denying revival of liens when a judgment creditor
redeems was discussed at length, and apparently approved, in
Paddack v. Staley, 4 and was applied in Jenkins v. Gold Dollar
Mining and Milling Co.8 5 so as to cut out an intervening mortgagee
who had failed to redeem. Then came the important case of
Stryker v. Dunn." This was the first case arising under the stat-
ute permitting redemption by subsequent encumbrances from a
Public Trustee's Sale. The court held that redemption by C:,
holder of a third deed of trust, after foreclosure by C1, revived
the lien of C2, holder of an intermediate deed of trust, who had
failed to redeem. The older cases, all decided under a different
statute, were not cited.
The last case decided under the old law was Harrington v.
Anderson,8 7 which cannot be reconciled with Stryker v. Dunn.
This also involved a Public Trustee's sale. The foreclosing holder
I ld. § 11.
;'The saving clause provides for redemption under the old law "where the.
method of redemption is part of the contract." The effect of this limitation is
not clear.
"Morris, Foreclosure by Sale by Public Trustee, 28 DICTA 437 (1951).
11 7 Colo. App. 498, 44 Pac. 373 (1896).
12 63 Colo. 22, 164 Pac. 504 (1917)
"'CoLo. STAT. AN-., c. 40, § 161 (1935).
84 Note 76 supra.
s 27 Colo. App. 247, 149 Pac. 269 (1915).
s72 Colo. 45, 209 Pac. 644 (1922).
s Colo. 417, 288 Pac. 1049 (1930).
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of the senior trust deed recovered a junior judgment and re-
deemed from his own sale. This was held to cut out the lien of
an intervening recorded judgment. No mention was made of
Stryker v. Dunn. If any amendments to the statute had a bear-
ing on this change in the law, there is nothing in the opinion to
indicate this.
With the case-law on revival of liens in this confused and
unsatisfactory state, the rule of the 1929 Act comes as a welcome
relief. No liens revive when a lienor redeems: junior liens, but
not the lien of the foreclosed mortgage, revive when the owner
redeems. Admittedly, this is paraphrasing the statute. Only the
effect of redemption by the owner has been passed on by the
courts, s8 and there is a remote possibility that the effect of redemp-
tion by a lienor may be interpreted so as to permit revival of liens.
It is devoutly to be hoped that nothing of this sort will occur.
IMPORTANCE OF THE REDEMPTION STATUTE
Actual redemption is a rare phenomenon. No genuine case
of redemption by the owner has come before the Colorado Supreme
Court in thirty years. There are only a handful of cases involv-
ing redemption by lienors during this time, and none at all con-
cerning redemption by persons liable on a deficiency. Many law-
yers go through years of practice without ever handling a case in
which redemption is attempted. This may easily create the im-
pression that the subject is one of only theoretical interest, to be
studied only when the situation arises directly.
This would be a very shortsighted view. The very existence
of the possibility of redemption is an important factor in every
foreclosure. In the first place, without a thorough knowledge of
the Redemption Act, a lawyer may request the Sheriff or Public
Trustee to issue a deed prematurely. Again, he may find himself
in a procedural bog such as engulfed the Home Owners' Loan Cor-
poration in the Meyer case, 9 resulting in an altogether unintended
redemption. More to the point, however, is the fact that a lawyer
cannot properly advise a foreclosing mortgagee as to the amount
he should bid at the sale, unless he realizes the possible loss which
may result if a redemption should happen to follow. The statute
is designed to exert a mental coercion upon the mortgagee, com-
pelling him to bid a fair price if he is cognizant of the terms of
the statute. Ignorance of them, as the court pointed out in the
Meyer case, will not excuse the mortgagee or relieve him of his
difficulties. The time necessary for a lawyer to acquire a thorough
understanding of the redemption law will be well spent, and will
enable him to give the kind of advice which will prevent mort-
gagees from making mistakes such as those often appearing in
the reported cases.
Many states have no redemption statutes, and some of these
-Home Owners Loan Corporation v. Meyer, 110 Colo. 501, 136 P. 2d 282
(1943).
Im 110 Colo. 501, 136 P. 2d 282 (1943).
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have abandoned them after a thorough trial. The whole idea of
permitting redemption after foreclosure has been severely criti-
cized. It adds to the length of time that must intervene before
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale gets a clear title. This def-
initely discourages speculative bidding, almost the only kind that
can be expected at foreclosure sales, except for persons seeking
to protect their own interests. It has been pointed out that every-
thing which adds to a lender's expense sooner or later is charged
as a cost to the borrower. 0
In view of these considerations, can the Colorado Redemption
Act be considered a worthwhile piece of legislation? The argu-
ments seem to be fairly evenly balanced. We have had redemption
so long that it seems unlikely that the practice will be abandoned.
On the whole it is not advisable to sacrifice the favorable results
of the redemption law, which produce higher bids by mortgagees
and lower deficiency judgments. The possibility that interest rates
might be lower and mortgage money easier to obtain if there were
no redemption law is too uncertain to justify giving up these
very positive advantages.
Is it possible to improve the method of redemption? Some
question may be raised as to whether liens should be revived when
the owner redeems. This revival has been thought necessary to
protect the junior lienors when redemption by the owner comes
first. It has been suggested that if the period of redemption by
lienors preceded the period for redemption by the owner, there
would be no need for revival of liens."' The Colorado statute might
be improved by reversing the time for redemption by owners and
lienors and shortening the period for the owner to redeem to three
months in order to promote speculative bidding at the foreclosure
sale.
,o Bridewell, The Effects of Defective Mortgage Laws on Home Financing,
5 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 544 (1938).
11 Durfee and Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform
Act, 23 MIcH. L. REV. 825 (1925).
I WOT THAT LAWYERS WITEN MUCH
I am sure that no attorney would attempt to use any word
with which he was not thoroughly familiar and am therefore
amazed at the profound learning of my brethren at the Bar and
their knowledge of early English words. The verb "wot" has a
very ancient and noble lineage and a well established place in the
English language which today is preserved almost solely by law-
yers and such other conveyancers as are allowed by Committees
on Unauthorized Practice to ply their trade. For the enlighten-
ment of less informed laymen the verb "wot" is almost the exact
equivalent of "know." The original form, in the present, was I
wot, thou wottest, he wot or wotteth, we, you and they witen. The
form of "wot" found most frequently is the "to wit" used in most
conveyances in a manner which, but for common usage, would be
of highly questionable syntax. T. J. O'NEILL.
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